

## HUMBOLDT COUNTY ELECTIONS INTEGRITY IT'S OKAY TO VOTE!

### SUMMARY

*“Never doubt that a small group of thoughtful, committed citizens can change the world: Indeed, it’s the only thing that ever has.” – MARGARET MEAD*

The Humboldt County Civil Grand Jury (HCCGJ) directed its attention to the procedures for voting and the counting of votes for the November 08, 2022 General Election. The current national political climate has prompted people to question the integrity and accuracy of even our local elections. The recent election provided us with a good opportunity to closely observe the process of voting and vote counting in Humboldt County with particular attention to election integrity and vote security.

The Humboldt County Elections Office continues to provide its citizens with a fair and impartial election accessible to all eligible voters which is the backbone of our great democracy. The Humboldt County Civil Grand Jury has investigated the County Clerk-Recorder’s office that oversees elections three times over the last two decades to ensure the integrity, accuracy, and accessibility of the voting process. Our current investigation began weeks before the November 2022 election. We wanted to observe voting by mail and how the computer software maintained a fair and impartial system. We can confirm that county employees, citizen poll workers and independent monitors did a professional job. We did find some minor areas that could use the attention of the Elections Office and made recommendations that will lead to an even better work environment.

The Humboldt County Civil Grand Jury believes that having the ability to vote for government officials and laws through an election process is one of the greatest rights we have as American citizens. It allows us as people in our communities to determine who represents and governs us. Maintaining the integrity of the elections process, voter registration, ballot accessibility, polling locations and vote counting is essential to making us all a part of the democratic process.

The Humboldt County Civil Grand Jury did an extensive study of the voting processes. We observed the pre-election testing of election equipment, training of poll workers and the initial processing of vote by mail ballots interviewing many of the personnel in charge. On Election Day, we watched the opening and closing of the polls and the first tabulation of votes at the Elections Office. Finally, we witnessed the final certification of the voting results.

## **GLOSSARY**

**BT:** Ballot Type

**EC:** State of California Election Code

**EIMS:** Election Information Management System

**EO:** Elections Office

**ETP:** Elections Transparency Project

**HAVA:** Help America Vote Act

**HCCGJ:** Humboldt County Civil Grand Jury

**HCEO:** Humboldt County Elections Office

**LAT:** Logic and Accuracy Test

**VBM:** Vote-by-Mail

## **BACKGROUND**

To fully understand the complicated structure of our local elections, an overview of our local county Elections Office is necessary. In Humboldt County, the Elections Office is a division of the Clerk-Recorder Office. The Clerk-Recorder, also known as the Registrar of Voters, is a non-partisan position elected at a General Election to a four-year term. The Clerk-Recorder has the following responsibilities:

- **Clerk** – Provides a variety of direct public services such as issuing marriage licenses; filing fictitious business name statements; filing and qualifying notary public oaths and bonds; processing passport applications; posting environmental documents; registering process servers; administering and filing oaths of office; filing Grand Jury reports; and filing, indexing, and maintaining a variety of miscellaneous public documents. The County Clerk is the Commissioner of Civil Marriages and may perform civil marriage ceremonies.

• **Recorder** – Files and maintains public documents associated with real estate land transactions, including sales, liens, purchases, easements, and maps. The Recorder files and maintains documents associated with vital statistics including births, deaths, and marriages; and maintains a cumulative record of all official documents for the county.

• **Registrar of Voters** – The Registrar of Voters, aided by numerous assistants, is responsible for ensuring all eligible residents have an opportunity to exercise their voting rights; ensuring elections are being conducted in a fair, accurate and efficient manner; and providing reliable information to candidates and voters. This official registers all voters in the county and maintains the voter files; verifies petitions; files campaign statements except for city elections, which are conducted by the City Clerk; conducts all elections in the county (federal state, county, school, and special district elections); and contracts with some cities to conduct their elections. Cities, schools, and special district elections pay for the costs of their elections; county, state, and federal elections are paid for by the county.

## **METHODOLOGY**

### **Observation:**

Humboldt County Civil Grand Jury members observed the following events and activities with respect to the conduct of the Statewide General Election, November 08, 2022, by the Humboldt County Elections Office.

- Logic and Accuracy Test of Hart InterCivic Verity® scanner and software (LAT 10/03/22);
- Poll Workers training (10/13/22);
- Pre-Election-Day receipt and processing of vote-by-mail (VBM) envelopes in which a signature image is recorded from each envelope (“first-run” of VBM ballot envelopes through Fluence machine);
- Election Day setting-up of in-person polls at 6am, the opening of polls at 7am, and the closing of in-person polls at 8pm (11/08/22);
- Election Day delivery of ballots and scanners from in-person voting locations to the Elections Office after 8pm poll closing, delivery of drop boxes to the Elections Office after 8pm poll closing, initial count of ballots after 8pm (11/08/22);
- Verification of questionable signatures;

- Post-Election-Day receipt and processing of vote-by-mail (VBM) envelopes containing ballots, Fluence “first run;”
- Opening of VBM envelopes after signature verification, Fluence “second-run;”
- Removal of ballots from VBM envelopes;
- Verification of questionable, mismarked, or damaged ballots in good-faith attempt to discern voter intent;
- Ballot scanning and tally of votes by Hart Verity® equipment and software;
- Scanning of ballots by Elections Transparency Project (ETP) personnel through their own equipment in which they record the image and print a serial number on each ballot (11/15/22);
- One-percent manual tally.

### **Interviews:**

Humboldt County Civil Grand Jury members interviewed several key Elections Office personnel and members of the community.

### **Document Access and Review:**

Humboldt County Civil Grand Jury members reviewed multiple documents including but not limited to:

- Elections Office instruction, and policy and procedure documents;
- California Secretary of State policy and procedure online documentation; <https://www.sos.ca.gov/Elections>
- California Elections Code; <https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov>
- California law regarding public verification and manual count as summarized in: Public Verification of Software Vote Counts and California’s Manual Count Law; <https://archive.calvoter.org/issues/votingtech/manualcount.html>
- Election certification documents submitted to the California Secretary of State;
- Hart InterCivic documentation; <https://www.hartintercivic.com/>
- Fluence Automation documentation; <https://www.fluenceautomation.com/>

- Elections Transparency Project (ETP) documentation;
- Poll Workers Training Manual.

## **DISCUSSION**

The Humboldt County Civil Grand Jury (HCCGJ) observed double and triple checks taken by Elections Office staff to ensure a safe and secure election. The following discussion will describe this process in detail.

### **State of California Election Code (EC) Paper Ballot Mandates:**

Ballots are created by the Elections Office staff. The order in which candidates are listed on the ballot varies. The EC specifies procedures, EC § 13111, for the order in which candidates are listed on the ballot to reduce the effect of listing order on voting. These procedures are followed in Humboldt County. Ballots are printed and secured by the Times Printing Company, Eureka, CA -- a printing service certified and licensed by the California Secretary of State. The ballot paper is a specific weighted paper and watermarked.

### **Pre-Election Logic and Accuracy Testing (LAT):**

Humboldt County uses the Hart InterCivic® voting technology hardware and software System. <https://www.hartintercivic.com> This system has been tested and certified by the California Secretary of State. <https://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/ovsta/votingtechnology-vendors>

On October 03, 2022, the Humboldt County Elections Office (HCEO) conducted a mandated Logic and Accuracy Test (LAT) of this system. We observed this test. All scanning tabulators and voting equipment to be used at voting locations go through LAT. This process is available to both observers and online to the public. To utilize the LAT, ballot scanning and tabulation equipment are reset to wipe out all previously used information.

The computers are then programmed with current election information and tested for integrity and accuracy using controlled test ballots and simulations. They are then sealed with tamper proof seals and sent to a secure, locked caged area by two election employees. These employees sign a log to enter the cage area with time and date notation and use a designated key fob. Once all the processes and tests are validated, verified, and equipment sealed, only certain seals are removed to open the polls for voters' use. All other seals remain in place.

## **General Election of November 08, 2022 and Voting:**

Beginning October 10, 2022, a vote-by-mail ballot (VBM) was mailed to the address of every registered voter in Humboldt County. According to the HCEO, the final number of registered voters was 84,792 and the final number of voters was 48,741.

### **How votes are cast:**

- Early voting: Voting in-person at the Elections Office prior to Election Day.
- Submitting a Vote-by-Mail ballot; Voting by mail from your home, to be picked up by a US Mail worker or deposited into a US Post Office mailbox with a postmark no later than midnight on Election Day.
- Placing the ballot in the U.S. mail (postpaid) envelope or delivering the ballot to the Elections Office. There is a secure outside drop-box at the Elections Office and an additional inside drop-box the Elections Office;
- Delivering the ballot to any in-person voting locations on Election Day;
- Depositing the ballot in a drop-box at one of 10 locations. At each location, the drop-box is indoors and is accessible only during business hours.

### **Election Day:**

During our visit to the Elections Office, we were shown polling machines, laptops, logs of voters, and other supplies prepared for the in-person voting locations. All this equipment was secured. We also obtained Election Observer passes from the Elections Office a week before the election, so we could observe the polling process. The public may also obtain these same passes.

Before the polls opened, we observed several voting locations in Humboldt County for the polling equipment setup. Setting up a polling place is challenging. Sometimes equipment is not working properly, or information has been misplaced. Several mishaps occurred causing delays in opening the polling stations. The delays were minor and did not affect the election process.

HCCGJ members observed voters coming to the polling stations. Voters start at the information desk to confirm their identity as a registered voter. If their name is not found in the Poll Pad (an electronic identifying device) or on the official roster, poll workers call the Elections Office to identify the voter. If the identity is confirmed, the voter

continues to the voting booth with the ballot given to them. If no information is found, the voter is sent to another table to use a Provisional Ballot. Provisional ballots are calculated separately. There is a drop-box for VBMs at every polling place.

**Morning Shift:** We arrived at 6am to observe the opening of the precinct polling location. Because we had observed Poll Workers training, we could easily follow along with the set up. At all observed locations, the poll workers and managers knew their jobs well and the setup went smoothly. There was a delay in the opening at one location.

At several locations, we observed the voters were not required to sign the roster. This was a procedural error. Every voter on the roster must sign their name. The error was reported to the Elections Office, then the Poll Manager made the appropriate adjustments. Access to polling locations was easy with available parking and large, clear signs of where to vote. There was also good lighting and disability access.

**Evening Shift:** HCCGJ members arrived at 7:30pm. At 8pm, it was announced “Voting has Ended,” and the doors were closed. Poll workers placed the ballots in secure canvas bags to be delivered to the Elections Office that night. Other poll workers disassembled equipment, packed supplies, and placed required reports into sealed envelopes. The poll workers worked together as a team to help each other. The final step in this process is for the evening poll workers to run tapes of information about the voting results from their polling station. They receive long tapes of information from the voting machines that include how many people voted that day at that location and a tally of results. These results are taped to the outside window of the precinct and for the public to see and review.

**Drop Boxes:** Every other day, a team of two election workers picks up the ballots, seals them in a bag, fills out an audit log and replaces the seals on the box. The drop boxes are sealed and closed on Election Day at 8pm.

### **How Votes Are Counted and Reported:**

At the Elections Office, every room where the ballots are processed is electronically secured. Elections Office staff need two levels of permission, one to get on the floor by signing a log and another electronically to enter the room. Elections Office staff must always work in teams of two and are required to log-in and log-out by printing their name, date and time of entry and exit.

VBMs come into the Elections Office daily. They are electronically processed through the “Fluence machine.” As the VBMs come in, the envelopes are placed in bins. The ballots are accepted through Election Day. Any VBMs postmarked by the end of Election Day are accepted. One at a time, bins are taken into the room where the Fluence machine is located and readied for the “first pass” through the machine.

Then signatures from past elections and comparisons are imported into the Fluence system from the Elections Information Management System (EIMS).

<https://verifiedvoting.org/election-system/dfm-associates-eims/> At this point, the Fluence machine is programmed to recognize differences in signatures. Every VBM signature is subsequently checked by a human being.

Each bin has its own batch number. This batch number is then programmed into the Fluence machine that prints the batch number on the envelopes as they are run. This is known as the “first pass.” The Fluence machine “captures” the signature on the envelopes. The Fluence machine will reject envelopes for any of the following reasons:

- Last year’s envelope;
- Damage to the envelope;
- Out of County envelope;
- No signature on the envelope;
- An obvious signature mismatch from the last election’s EIMS signature. (Here is where Fluence compares signatures). This must be an obvious or a definite change in signature;
- Irregularity of weight or thickness of the envelope.

These rejected envelopes are taken to the front office election personnel to be checked by hand to try to validate the envelope containing a ballot. A log is initiated to keep track of these envelopes. The signature on each VBM is checked by two different election officials. A Fluence trained election worker compares each signature captured by the “first pass” and the signature image on record in the EIMS system. The signature comparison is run again by a different employee on another computer. If there is a question of a VBM signature that needs further investigation, a Fluence log is initiated and the VBM is pulled. The benefit of the doubt is given to the voter and every effort made to ensure the VBM is counted. During the “second pass,” checked and cleared VBMs are joined with the corresponding batch number. The VBMS that were previously checked and cleared for counting are placed in their corresponding batch.

VBMs are sliced open on the bottom of the envelope. If the cleared VBM is rejected again, they are hand sorted to their precinct bins. The accepted VBMs are automatically sent to their precinct bins. The “second pass” batch also has its individual number, which is cross referenced to the “first pass” batch.



The Fluence machine captures the image of the signatures on the outside of the envelopes. The VBM is valid only if there is a signature on the envelope. If it is missing a signature, an Elections Office official will call the voter to come to the Elections Office to sign their envelope. At their request, the VBM can be mailed to the voter to sign.

The VBMs containing the ballots are taken to a separate room where they are placed face down. Two election workers, supervised by an Elections Office official, remove and separate the ballots from the envelopes by hand and the ballots are inspected for damage. When this is done, the ballots are put in cardboard boxes, sealed, and taken to the ballot counting room. The envelopes are placed in a bin and transported to the secure caged room. The envelopes and ballots are kept for up to 2 years per the State of California Election Code (EC), and then destroyed.

The votes are counted in a locked, secure caged room. Inside this room, a Hart scanner takes an image of each ballot and tallies the number of votes for the respective candidates and ballot measures. The system runs on a closed network, not connected to the internet. The server for this system is in a safe location away from the Elections Office.

As VBMs come in, the tallies stay within the non-internet-connected computers. After polls close on Election Day, election officials put the results on special USB flash drives that have been scrubbed through a Department of Defense-certified device. The USB ports on all the computers are locked and require a special key to insert flash drives. Then officials insert the flash drives into the one internet-connected machine, which is on a separate server outside of the closed network and upload the results directly onto the official California Secretary of State website. The count is acknowledged and confirmed by telephone.

While there may be errors, these errors do not indicate widespread fraud or conspiracies. However, some procedures could be overridden by people or employees. The probability of this is practically nil. There are many checks and balances, and these checks and balances are followed.

### **Canvass:**

Immediately upon the close of polls on Election Day, the Elections Officials begin canvassing the vote – counting and tallying VBM and in-person precinct voted ballots. This process continues for thirty days. During this period, counts and tallies are updated by the HCEO each Friday. The vote canvassing process begins seven (7) business days before the election, with the VBM ballots received before Election Day. No results are reported until after the close of polls on Election Day. The California Elections Code requires that the official canvass begin no later than the Thursday following the election, that it be open to the public, and that it continues daily (weekends

and holidays excepted) for not less than six hours each day until completed. Elections Officials must complete the official canvass and submit a certified statement of the results of the election to the California Secretary of State by the 31st day after the election.

**Activities undertaken during the official canvass include:**

- Counting and tallying of valid VBM and provisional ballots. Provisional ballots are cast by voters whose names do not appear on the precinct roster. The voter uses a regular precinct ballot which is then placed in a special envelope that the voter must sign, much like a VBM envelope. During the official canvass, the elections official checks the voter registration file to verify the voter's eligibility to cast the ballot. Once verified, the ballot is added to the official count and tally. A reconciliation of the number of signatures on the roster with the number of ballots recorded on the ballot statement;
- A reconciliation of the number of ballots counted, spoiled, canceled, or invalidated due to identifying marks or overvotes with the number of votes counted, including VBM and provisional ballots;
- Counting any valid write-in votes;
- Reproducing any damaged ballots, if necessary;
- Conducting a manual one (1) percent hand count of the ballots chosen at random by the elections officials;
- Reporting and certifying final results to the California Secretary of State.

**Manual Tally:**

A one percent manual tally is required by the State of California Election Code. This procedure is conducted during the official canvass to verify the accuracy of the automated count. One person calls out voters elections (choices) and another records the results on paper. Ballots are then batched into groups of approximately 100-200 ballots and either sent back to the secure cage room for scanning at a later time or scanned into the scanning machine. After scanning, results are compared to the written log. If there is discrepancy, everything stops until the reason for the discrepancy is found. For example, this could be a miscount of hand ballots or a scanner rejection. Until the discrepancy is resolved, no further action is taken on that particular batch of ballots. The manual tally report must be included in the certification of the official canvass of the vote. This report

identifies any discrepancies between the machine count and the manual tally, and a description of how each of these discrepancies was resolved.

<https://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/post-election-audits/1percent-manual-tally>  
(<https://www.vrifiedvoting.org/>)

### **Voting While Serving in the Military Living Outside of Humboldt County:**

A Humboldt County registered voter serving in the military outside of Humboldt County has the right to vote. Upon request, the HCEO will provide them with a ballot.

### **Elections Transparency Project:**

Humboldt County uniquely has a group of volunteer citizens that have developed a system to count and tally votes. This group is known as the Elections Transparency Project (ETP). This is a 501(c)(3) public-benefit nonprofit corporation.

The ETP organization believes that voters should have proof that their votes are being counted accurately. Humboldt County citizens have the right to see the ballots that were cast and can have access to the ballots after being counted and tallied by the Elections Office. Having an independent group to generate digitally signed images of the ballots is a practical way to verify the ballot count and vote.

At this time, the HCCGJ could not find any evidence of a Contract or Memorandum of Understanding between the HCEO and ETP. It is unclear exactly how the responsibilities and access to the secure areas for ETP are determined.

ETP volunteer members go to the HCEO to perform their count. ETP volunteers are given temporary access under supervision to run the ballots through their own scanner and counting software. Each ballot is imprinted with an ETP serial number. The ballot images are saved on a separate hard drive. Their count is compared to the Elections Office certified count. The results are eventually reported on the ETP website.

<https://electionstransparencyproject.com> The respective counts are equal or very close. The respective counts may slightly differ due to markings or imperfections on a few ballots, or the differences between the Hart scanner used by the Elections Office and the scanner used by the ETP.

This group has earned credibility since it found a discrepancy in 2008 that revealed a fault in election ballot counting machines used at the time. Diebold equipment was then decertified by the California Secretary of State and replaced in Humboldt County with the Hart system.

A second action of the ETP is to tally the number of votes cast for each candidate and for-or-against each ballot measure. ETP developed software to address the imaged ballot taken by their scanner. The total votes candidate-by-candidate and pro-con for each measure are then tallied. The ETP's count and tally are first emailed to the Registrar of Voters and eventually presented as Excel spreadsheets on the ETP website.

The Elections Transparency Project is not affiliated with the HCEO but two board members were affiliated with the HCEO. One was a former Elections Office employee and the other was current employee at the time of the November 8, 2022 election. This may be misleading to the public and could be perceived as a potential conflict of interest for the HCEO and ETP. ETP does not publish its results until well after the election. If they were to publish their results sooner, then Humboldt County voters could do their own comparison.

### **Poll Worker Training:**

For the Poll Workers volunteering after the scheduled mandated training sessions, the HCCGJ did not observe any training provided to them. Instead, these new Poll Workers were assigned to their designated precincts for on-the-job training, causing additional stress on Poll Workers and Managers. Untrained workers can cause procedural errors.

Poll Workers receive classroom training. There are separate training sessions and manuals for both Poll Workers and Poll Managers. The HCCGJ attended the Poll Manager training session. The scheduled trainer at this session was unavailable; the replacement trainer used the Poll Workers Manual for the Poll Manager training session. The replacement trainer explained that since the manuals were very similar, it would not be an issue. Later we found the HCEO merged the Poll Workers Training Manual and the Poll Managers Training Manual. This is because the content is so similar it is more efficient and convenient to have only one manual. The Elections Office should make a clear distinction between workers duties and managers duties, however, because new managers had questions that were not satisfactorily answered because of time constraints. The HCCGJ did not observe a separate Poll Managers Manual for comparison but were told by several sources two different manuals exist.

### **Other Observations:**

During our observations and numerous interviews, we found that there was no written procedural manual for either the Elections Staff or the Registrar of Voters. We further found that information was communicated verbally and informally. A new employee would have no internal reference manual for answers. The tasks and responsibilities are not documented.

The HCEO Candidate Guide did not explain the order of candidate names for county-wide office. For the first supervisorial district, the candidate listing is based upon a random selection. Then, the order of names is rotated for each county supervisorial district. From one district to the next, the candidate in the #1 position is moved to the bottom of the list, and the other candidates move up.

The drop boxes are metal in which ballots are deposited through a slot in the box. The box is secured by small key locks and the box is attached to a cinder block at its base. The metal drop-box is on wheels. We observed that the drop boxes are on wheels with toe wheel locks. These drop boxes are easily moved by unlocking the locks and rolling them. They are not secured to a permanent fixture like the floor or wall of the building leaving the drop boxes unsecured.

## **FINDINGS:**

The Humboldt County Civil Grand Jury, while investigating the Elections Office during the election cycle of November 8, 2022, found that:

F1. The elections procedure was secure and had many double and triple checks to make sure the election was safe and secure.

F2. There is no internal manual describing the various election duties unique to Humboldt County. This could lead to specific job duties and tasks being overlooked.

F3. Some ballot drop boxes are not adequately secured in their designated locations, making their removal possible.

F4. The Candidate Guide does not explain listing order on the ballot for local government candidates, creating unnecessary confusion.

F5. Some managers did not receive the Poll Managers Training Manual but were taught from the Poll Workers Training Manual. This caused some unnecessary confusion with the successful completion of their duties.

F6. Some Poll Workers did not participate in mandatory training, which contributed to process errors.

F7. Having an outside nonprofit watchdog group is a useful check of ballot counting and tallying, providing validation to Humboldt County Elections.

F8. A Humboldt County Elections employee was serving on the Board of the nonprofit watchdog group validating that election. This results in the perception of a conflict of interest.

F9. There is no evidence of a Contract or Memorandum of Understanding between the Elections Office and the nonprofit watchdog volunteer group, known as the Elections Transparency Project, making the responsibilities of each entity unclear.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

The Humboldt County Civil Grand Jury recommends that:

R1. The Humboldt County Elections Office prepares policy and procedural manuals that can be amended and kept up-to-date annually or after each election. We recommend that this be completed before the next local, primary or general election. (F2)

R2. The Humboldt County Elections Office prepares a written matrix detailing specific duties and tasks to be performed and the persons responsible for those duties. We recommend that this be accomplished before the next local, primary or general election. (F2) (F5)

R3. The Humboldt County Elections Office replaces and upgrades ballot drop boxes for additional security. We recommend that this be accomplished before the next local, primary or general election. (F3)

R4. The Humboldt County Elections Office updates the Candidate Guide adding a section explaining candidate ballot listing order. This section shall be pursuant to the State of California Election Code § 13111. We recommend that this be accomplished before the next local, primary or general election. (F4)

R5. The Humboldt County Elections Office provides all Poll Workers with mandatory training prior to working on any election. We recommend that this be accomplished before the next local, primary or general election. (F6)

R6. The Humboldt County Elections Office creates either a Contract or Memorandum of Understanding between the Humboldt County Elections Office and any volunteer nonprofit watchdog group. We recommend that this be accomplished before the next local, primary or general election. (F8) (F9)

R7. The Humboldt County Elections Office assures the public that no County Elections Office employees serve on the board of directors of any election watchdog group. We recommend that this be accomplished before the next local, primary or general election. (F8) (F9)

## REQUEST FOR RESPONSES

Pursuant to California Penal Code sections 933 and 933.05, the Grand Jury requests each entity or individual named below to respond to the enumerated Findings and Recommendations within specific statutory guidelines.

Responses to Findings shall be either:

- The respondent agrees with the finding.
- The respondent disagrees wholly or partially with the finding, in which case the response shall specify the portion of the finding that is disputed and shall include an explanation of the reasons therefor.

Responses to Recommendations shall be one of the following:

- The recommendation has been implemented, with a summary regarding the implemented action.
- The recommendation has not yet been implemented, but will be implemented in the future, with a time frame for implementation.
- The recommendation requires further analysis, with an explanation and the scope and parameters of an analysis or study, and a time frame for the matter to be prepared for discussion by the officer or head of the agency or department being investigated or reviewed, including the governing body of the public agency where applicable. This time frame shall not exceed six months from the date of publication of the Grand Jury report.
- The recommendation will not be implemented because it is not warranted or is not reasonable, with an explanation therefor.

### Required Responses:

Pursuant to Penal Code sections 933 and 933.05, the Humboldt County Civil Grand Jury request responses as follows:

From the following official within sixty (60) days:

Clerk-Recorder: **(F1, F2, F3, F4, F5, F6, F7, F8, F9),  
(R1, R2, R3, R4, R5, R6, R7).**

### Invited Responses:

Board of Directors, Elections Transparency Project: **(F8, F9), (R6, R7).**

<p>Reports issued by the Grand Jury do not identify individuals interviewed. Penal Code section 929 requires that reports of the Grand Jury not contain the name of any person or facts leading to the identity of any person who provides information to the Grand Jury.</p>
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*This report was issued by the Grand Jury with the exception of two jurors who asked to be recused.*